Imprisonment and Criminal Discourse by Filippini, Leonardo
 
 






In this work, I would like to question the canonical view of prison, which underlies the 
daily practice of law, and criminal law courses at law schools. Our criminal discourse 
excessively limits, or even forbids, the possibility of discussing imprisonment. In this way, 
imprisonment, a rudimentary and brutal tool, is criminal law´s ordinary means of 
punishment, and there is no evidence that legal operators will critically question it in these 
days.    
Criminal law tolerates overcrowding, death, violence and corruption as if they were 
natural. Any person—specially lawyers, criminal judges, legislators or criminal law 
professors—knows that prison is selective and violent, and that the value of constitutional 
guarantees inside prisons is less than their value outside. We all know that the possibility of 
judicial control over prisons is minimal and that prisons have their own rules, as in a 
sinister experiment of legal pluralism. 
I do not mean to question prisons here, but the insipid way in which legal operators 
refer to it. The way in which we shape the discourse of legal operators and the academic 
speech through which we train those operators is disappointing. Only very few paragraphs 
of criminal law handbooks, a very small part of legal education, and almost no part of the 
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language of judges, lawyers and prison guards reflect imprisonment´s problems in a useful 
way, or offer tools to criticize it.  
Criminal law´s speech seems to have abandoned the question on punishment. We 
discuss when and for how long imprisonment should be impose, but almost never whether 
imprisonment is justified in a particular case, as a the appropriate punishment or retribution, 
nor have the enormous flow of ideas and thought over the issue in other areas of knowledge 
seeped through legal speech. In the end, law is considered to be a speech used to limit 
imprisonment, but it has not yet claimed its authority to scrutinize imprisonment´s own 
existence as the prevailing criminal practice.  
In the following section, I will give more details about the matter that motivates this 
work. Later, I will try to show how law´ s speech has progressively retracted when facing 
the imprisonment phenomenon and I will suggest some lines of thought to make the 
question on the different ways to punish recover its paramount place in education and in 
legal practice. The statement underlying these words is simple. I believe that, if criminal 
law´ s speech hopes to be relevant and actually limit state´ s power, it should recover its 
interest in the different ways to punish.  
 
1. Criminal law´ s prevailing understanding of imprisonment 
 
Imprisonment is still the prevailing legal answer to certain forbidden behaviors, 
especially when they directly jeopardize life, private property or sexual integrity. The core 
idea behind the practice of imprisonment is that, all things considered, it is still an 
acceptable compromise between social interest, victim´s interests and the offender´s 




Basically, imprisonment is the intense restriction of a person´s right to freedom of 
movement that is imposed on those who have committed a crime, and is put into practice 
by locking her up for a period established by law or judicially.  When imprisonment is 
established as a punishment, its duration is set according to the seriousness of the crime that 
is being punished and the circumstances in which it was committed; while when it is 
imposed before trial, it must be proportional to the possibility to neutralize the offender’s 
capacity to hinder the due course of the investigation and trial. In addition, we accept that 
imprisonment contributes to reestablishing confidence on the authority of law, and that 
preventive imprisonment is able to reduce the offender´ s chances to hamper legal 
procedures. 
Imprisonment, however, only poorly reflects these limits or fulfills these functions. 
Preventive imprisonment is used as anticipated punishment, before trial has been held, and 
is not really related to the need to assure legal procedures. Punishment through 
imprisonment does not always reflect the seriousness of the crime and there is no evidence 
of its ability to express or reinforce law´s authority.  In both cases, moreover, the rule is that 
the people who are imprisoned are those with less economic and social resources. 
To all these, it must be added that, notwithstanding the principle that states that 
punishment must be humane, most imprisonment situations allow that the right to body’s 
integrity of the imprisoned be violated and that he/she be excluded from his/her  life´s 
social and political spheres. Exclusion and ill treatments are the natural consequences of 




stresses that it is a proportional punishment to a crime or that it is a way to prevent that 
justice´ s ends from being frustrated.  2 
In the legal description, however, exclusion and ill treatments are not distinctive 
elements of imprisonment. To the contrary, we consider them exceptional and they are 
forbidden. We tend to think that torture or isolation are not part of the imprisonment´s 
essence. They are extraordinary consequences that may be foreseeable and usual but are 
never necessary. 
Criminal law, resorts to imprisonment as its´ preferred tool to face the most serious 
conflicts, and trusts the possibility to impose it in a way that respects convicts´ dignity. This 
is the way in which we refer to imprisonment in law school and this is the understanding 
that underlies the practice of lawyers and judges. We discuss the forms of punishment, or 
one particular aspect or a particular form of punishment only exceptionally. And when we 
do it, the institution of imprisonment is never jeopardized.  
According to criminal law, imprisonment can always be justified. Law controls 
when, for how long, and how it must be imposed—for example,  the separation of minors 
from adults, or those who are preventively imprisoned from those who are serving a 
sentence—but the justice of imprisonment is never put into question.  Criminal law 
writings and justice operators assume that imprisonment, if imposed correctly, can be 
justified and that it is not law´s task to question that justification.  
Criminal practice continues to be based on an idea of equality that is essentially 
formal. The rationale behind the criminal law system is that those who are in prison are the 
people who breached a criminal duty and that they were imprisoned through an 
                                                            





independent judicial decision and according to a precise, certain, written and previous law.3 
Reality reminds us that not all of us run the same risks. Not all crimes are judged; conducts 
that are judged are not necessarily the most serious ones and not everyone is treated with 
the same harshness.4   
 Despite its judicial validity, formal equality, rationality and proportionality ideals 
do not stand before the evidence that shows that the criminal system creates and holds 
second class citizens. Given the lack of a substantive idea of equality5 —that at least 
examines the uneven impact of our criminal laws—we can only hope for some organization 
of the use of imprisonment and, at best, a reduction of abuses, but not the scrutiny of 
imprisonment in the light of the Constitution´s ideals. 
 
2. Law and punishment 
The birth of prison was associated to a discussion on the forms of punishment. Prison has 
been, and still may be thought of as, a modern development that functioned as an 
intellectual and practical option to replace the prevalence of the idea and practice of 
corporal punishment, as Michel Foucault explained when analyzing the process that took 
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place between the execution of regicide Damiens in 1757 and the establishment of the 
imprisonment system we know today.6  
 Local contexts adherent to modern ideas about punishment experimented a similar 
substitution process, as the one explained by Lila Caimari regarding the Argentine case.  In 
those contexts, legal discussion has been able to question and model the shape of 
punishment:  
“The reflection about the characteristics of State punishment in Argentine society 
begun with the first attempts to built the institutions of that same State. […] the first 
thinkers on the subject […] set a starting point that was specified until the real 
possibilities started to match, at least partially, the ideal projects. Given its adaptation 
to racionalist ideas of proportionality, its distance from the body, and its social 
invisibility, prison became gradually the reference punishment. Between 1870 and 
1890 its ideal characteristics were defined, following closely the utilitarian 
disciplinary models of the English and American penitentiary movement. The 
Penitenciaria Nacional [National Prison], opened in 1877, became the strongest 
symbol of punishment´ s update in Argentina […] it represented to the eyes of society 
the triumph of disciplinary modernity and it constituted a strong symbol of the State´ 
s power in formation.”7 
 
  Juan Bautista Alberdi —one of the main influences in Argentina´s Constitution 
proposed that “torment and horrible punishments” were “abolished forever and in all 
circumstances”. He also advised to prohibit “whipping and executions made with knifes, 
spears and fire” and to establish that “dark, humid and deadly prisons” should be 
“destroyed”.8   
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  The National Constitution finally established, with a more general language, that 
“Prisons will be healthy and clean, for the security and not the punishment of the detainee, 
and all measure that injures them more than is needed for precaution will make the 
authorizing judge responsible.”  
 
3. The abandonment of the discussion about prison 
 Successive reinterpretations of the goal and function of prison were also integrated to legal 
speech, and were either accepted or discussed by legal operators.9 The social rehabilitation 
ideal of the sixties, for example, was recognized by international human rights treaties such 
as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights10 that states that “The 
penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of prisoners the essential aim of which shall 
be their reformation and social rehabilitation”  (Art. 10.3). 
   Today nobody truly believes that imprisonment can comply with this function, nor 
states that it really does. Neither are there many supporters of the idea of a factory-prison 
that imposes discipline to mold detainee´ s bodies to make them match economic needs, nor 
people convinced of the need of pure retribution. However, there is not much in the 
immediate horizon that anticipates the end of imprisonment in the way we know it.   
 The speech that supports imprisonment still repeats modern ideas regarding 
punishment, but without the original conviction. We impose a punishment but we seriously 
suspect that it does not perform any verifiable function. However, in practice we support, at 
least temporarily, one of these possible theories when giving reasons for a conviction. Or 
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we shelter under the options made by legislators not because of deference to his criterion, 
but to avoid the discussion.   
 In criminal practice, live unenthusiastically pieces of justifications that, 
notwithstanding the contentions, have not been replaced by others. Criminal law as a 
whole, as Bacigalupo said, is understood today as a system aimed at reestablishing the 
communicational value of law and backs with punishment the authority of the breached 
rule.11  We doubt that the reproach to an infraction, expressed in the punishment of 
imprisonment, can effectively communicate the validity of a legal rule and contribute to the 
reestablishment of the authority of the right that was breached. 
 The justification of the reproach to which Bacigalupo refers is not convincing 
enough regarding the justification of punishment as a privileged means, and least regarding 
imprisonment as the preferred form of punishment. When the time comes to define the way 
to reproach, criminal practice abandons any justificatory enterprise and gives privilege to 
the option given by the modern legislator, more out of custom and inheritance than of 
conviction. Therefore, criminal practice relies on the idea that imprisonment reflects 
properly the idea of punishment as a consequence of the decision made by the legislator. 
 When there are enough proofs to believe that a crime has been committed, the main 
variable that legal operators can regulate is the duration of incarceration, and this is 
determined considering the seriousness of the offence. The idea behind the practice—which 
we do not discuss either— is that the greater seriousness of an offence can be properly 
reflected in the longer duration of imprisonment. Criminal practice does not discuss if 
incarceration should be the punishment, nor if its longer or shorter duration reflects the 
greater or lesser relevance of any element, or the extent of the reproach, or if one day in 
                                                            




prison means the same in all cases. It neither questions that very diverse offences can be put 
in the same level by using as a common denominator the days, months and years of 
imprisonment. Whatever it is the element that justifies the possibility to reproach and, in 
that case, to do it through punishment, we still believe that it should be measured in periods 
of time. 
Finally, we also expect that the serving of the sentence that imposed imprisonment 
will lead to the social rehabilitation of the convict. This is impossible. Not only because 
overcrowding and exclusion do not collaborate at all to rehabilitate a person, but also 
because the measure that subjected a person to overcrowding and exclusion is the result of 
a first decision related to the reestablishment the authority of law and of a second decision 
to limit a fundamental right according to the seriousness of the crime. We built 
imprisonment considering aims different to rehabilitation of the offender, but we expect 
that it fulfils that aim magically.12  
  As Alcira Daroqui pointed out, the inconsistence in criminal speech shows that “it 
has abandoned any moral justification of punishment, it has not been possible to support 
retribution as a just punishment since the moment that it has been recognized that the 
contract that was breached had never been entered by equals, when that just punishment 
turned useless, the  failure of rehabilitation and re-education meant not only the failure in 
its manifest ends but it also revealed the true meaning of an institution born to produce pain 
and suffering, and nothing more, and of course, nothing less”.13 
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sin embargo, que la pena de prisión colabore a un resultado que en modo alguno esperaríamos ocurra en el 
contexto de la prisión preventiva. 





 The discussions reflected in the reversion of a court´s sentence by another, or in the 
comments made by law professors and lawyers on certain judicial decisions focus on if and 
how much time of incarceration should be imposed in each case, but do not question the 
use of imprisonment as a preventive measure, if punishment is the correct way of 
expressing reproach, or imprisonment as the prevailing form of punishment. Legal 
literature describes the legal rules in a jurisdiction and spreads its concrete application by 
courts, through the systematized description of legal practices, but it does not discuss 
imprisonment either. And very few look in that literature for a critical thought, but for a a 
guide, as the one given by a map to those who look for short and effective directions. 14  
 In the end, imprisonment is still supported as a natural institution that is part or 
criminal practice. The overcrowding, the terrible conditions and a certain degree of 
violence are seen as necessary evils which, even if they are not desired, are tolerated as 
almost inevitable collateral damage of imprisonment. Efforts to minimize abuses never 
reach to the point of discrediting the idea of imprisonment. In some way, we all trust in the 
theoretical and practical possibility of imposing imprisonment without violence.  
 The problem, as already was stated, is that prison has never existed without that 
extra unjustified violence, even if our regular view makes us believe violence is natural, 
and puts distance between juridical sciences and the imprisonment problem. There is a very 
deep separation between penitentiary technique and justice that, as Josefina Martinez states, 
underlies a definition of legality that has abandoned reflection over punishment “more 
worried for the fulfilment of formal requisites that for particular practices.”15  
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 According to this vision, the use of force is a police and penitentiary competence 
“that can be exercised only inside the legal frame […] in that field, Justice does not care 
about the way in which violence is used, in which ways, to what degree […] The use of 
violence in the context of criminal bureaucracies bases its legitimacy in the legality of the 
means and focuses on the formal control of procedures. Specific bureaucratic practices 
easily escape the separated bars of this ´iron cage.´”16 
 
4. The place of legal speech 
 
One possible way of explaining the retraction of law is that it is not possible to expect much 
more from it. Eugenio Zaffaroni suggests that justice´s possibility to challenge the 
characteristics of imprisonment and imprisonment itself is minimal: 
 
 “Punitive power is not something we have in our hands that judges or criminal 
lawyers exercise, against everything we relieve in. The only thing we exercise and 
that we can exercise is juridical power. The only thing that judges can decide is that 
those clients that are previously selected by other agencies and taken to the,  are 
going to be subject to a secondary criminalization process. But those clients are 
selected by others, are taken by others and others are the ones who carry the 
procedure of secondary criminalization. Judges are not in charge of carrying it out, it 
is in charge of police agencies, execution agencies and penitentiary agencies. The law 
that we apply is made by others, in other words, politicians. The power that we have 
as criminal lawyers is the power to influence the judicial agency and nothing more, 
since the power of the agency we can influence is a reduced power to say yes or no, 
in this small number of cases that other agencies have previously selected and have 
taken to them for them to decide […] juridical agencies do not have in their hands the 
power to create or to eliminate crimes (called primary criminalization), not to select 
                                                            




the clients of the criminal system or to carry the procedure of secondary 
criminalization against certain persons.”17.   
 
However, it is still possible that criminal law can—and in consequence, should—have a 
more important role, and defy some structural conditions of imprisonment.  
Judges, for example, could hold constitutional values that are contrary to the 
situations that endorse abuse practices. As Wacquant suggests, they can contribute to 
“stop the semantic adrift that, on one side, compress the space for debate (when, for 
example, the notion of insecurity is limited to physical insecurity, excluding social and 
economic insecurity) and, on the other hand, to make more trivial the criminal treatment 
of those tensions linked to the deepening of social inequalities”18.   
  It may occur that nothing is possible if other cultural and social conditions are 
missing, but there is room to imagine a different performance of criminal knowledge. 
Law can also defy prevailing social views in both its speech as in its concrete practice.19  
There are many examples of the constitutional invalidation of laws that 
criminalize certain acts, of management initiatives inside the judiciary, or of 
disagreement on spaces and resources with other powers and for the most diverse topics. 
Why should not we be able to expect that lawyers and judges take a more active role 
facing generalized abuses in prison? Are there really insurmountable limitations that 
prevent us from larger control or from thinking on a deeper alternative? 
                                                            
17 Eugenio Raúl Zaffaroni, APUNTES SOBRE EL PENSAMIENTO PENAL EN EL TIEMPO, Hammurabi, 2007, 
Primera Conferencia, pp. 18-19.  In the same line, en DERECHO PENAL – PARTE GENERAL, cit., p. 20. 
18 Loïc. Wacquant, LAS CÁRCELES DE LA MISERIA , Manantial, 2000, p. 170. Of course, it is not self evident 
and requires its own assumptions. Zaffaroni, for example, holds that “We are usually cheated making us 
believe that according to our speech punitive power is exercised. And our narcisims makes us believe such a 
fallacy, when actually punitive power works alone and we accompany it with a speech that  […] sometimes 
legitimazes it and other times criticizes it”, APUNTES SOBRE EL PENSAMIENTO PENAL EN EL TIEMPO, cit., 
Segunda Conferencia, p. 58. 
19 Rita Segato, El derecho a nombrar el sufrimiento en el derecho, in Voces y Silencios de la Discriminación, 





5. Discussing prison  
 
As I advanced, I believe that our discussion about punishment is disappointing. I do not yet 
see proper tools for the discussion, nor even a consolidated worry regarding that lack.  
Alternatives to imprisonment do not come out simply because we are not looking for any 
alternative. At least, we do not do it in law schools or in legal practice. 
 In this work I intend to say that it is possible, and that it would be possible, to 
reinstate the discussion about punishment.  Let´ s think, for example, how should we talk to 
our students about imprisonment? Can we trust that the usual way in which criminal and 
constitutional law courses refer to the topic give an accurate image of the phenomenon of 
prison to whom is interested in law and that it offers solid theoretical tools for its 
discussion? Are we offering a broad and defying education or our textbooks and views 
improperly limit the object of study? Does legal practice offer any alternative? Or it only 
reproduces and feeds from the limitations of the usual way of thinking about prison? 
Definitively, are we offering an adequate theoretical framework? 
We should start trusting less on the possibility to continue talking about 
imprisonment as state´s reaction to crime limited to the restriction of the right to freedom of 
movement, based on the causes and for the time specified in criminal laws. As David 
Garland pointed out, “The shapes taken by punishment reveal the need to reflect on 
punishment itself and, when we try to do it- even if it is superficially—we follow certain 
pre-established and pre-delimited patterns […] we are induced to think criminal policies in 
the current  institutional framework, instead of questioning them- as we do when we 




established or when we determine the penalties, instead of asking ourselves  which is the 
reason to use those measures.”20  
  Why could not we start talking about imprisonment in some other way? And teach 
for example that the most widely accepted legal reaction to crime is the State´s interference 
with bodily integrity and the social bonds of those who have committed a crime, through 
incarceration that is only regulated by criminal law in what respects to its duration and 
minimal execution content, but left unregulated in all other aspects. 
 We should openly show to those who are interested in criminal law that law only 
limits the duration of incarceration without even trying to limit the consequences on 
detainees´ bodily integrity and social bonds. Imprisonments´ consequences go far beyond 
the time of effective incarceration, and the law says very little about this. And we say even 
less in class and in court. 
 Argentina´s Supreme Court´s case Villarreal21 shows the validity of this approach. 
A detainee had requested a remedy as a consequence of the beatings she had been subjected 
to.  The case was never properly investigated and the detainee finally recovered her liberty. 
The Court declared that since the moment the detainee was set free there was no longer a 
case that could be decided by a court. The Court confirmed that law does not tell us 
anything about the conditions that make it possible to be beaten up in prison nor about the 
fate of a person after being legally punished. These issues are “abstract” for the law. What 
is concrete, and what judges can decide on, are actual and direct injuries, clearly stated by 
law and while the incarceration lasts. There is no discussion about imprisonment and the 
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pp. 17-18. 
21 CSJN, V. 1287. XL. RECURSO DE HECHO, “Villareal, Blanca Estela s/hábeas corpus”, file N° 45.996, 




ideas of prevention or post-punishment care are not considered as part of the punishment of 
imprisonment.22  
   Given this situation, I propose to start any discussion about imprisonment based on 
a more real description of it. Such a reflection would show the limitations of the current 
view in a much better way and would clarify that imprisonment as the prevailing idea to 
confront insecurity only implies political and social exclusion and the mistreatment of a 
group of people who have committed or are related to a crime.  
 
6. Three ways of discussing punishment 
As a finishing remark, I would like to suggest three proposals on how to state the 
discussion of imprisonment in criminal law today. Or, lets´s say, to state three guidelines 
that I myself would adopt to design the curricula of criminal law today. I do not say that 
these are the most adequate, but they try to frame themselves in the line of thought I have 
established so far and they would suppose an academic agenda very different from the one 
we have today. 
 Firstly, I believe that we should recover the role of sensitive experience in the 
process of education of lawyers and in legal practice. Today, lawyers or law students do not 
have to visit prisons or to talk to detainees. Lawyers do not know how many prisons there 
are, where they are situated or how crowded are they or what kind of services they provide. 
It would not be an exaggeration to say that this is law only incidentally. It simply is not a 
relevant issue in procedural criminal law to be exposed to first hand information about what 
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possibility to discuss imprisonment conditions in courts, shows an analogous situation, as also is all 






punishment really is. Of course, a doctor does not know how many beds are there in a 
hospital, but he touches his patients and we expect them to know and analyze the concrete 
consequences of his actions.  To the contrary, lawyers tend to naturalize the idea of 
imprisonment as a necessary evil and put an end to the discussion about the effects of 
imprisonment and the exploration of alternative ways to reproach. 
 Despite our essentially formal method, we expect any lawyer to have certain 
capacity to empathize with those groups who are the main focus of the criminal system and 
suffer its consequences. In other juridical areas, however, we believe that it would be 
almost impossible to do without knowing the specific qualities of a person, his/her 
testimony, voice, history and his/her direct contact with lawyers and judges. Oral 
procedures, the claim to establish jury trials, voting, public hearings are all ways of 
showing the importance that we give to direct contact with the person who is expressing or 
representing an interest. Prison, its´ means, its´ players, remain distant from the world of 
law. 
 Secondly, we should recover the practice of discussing punishment argumentatively. 
We could try the exercise without any trouble at least in law schools and legal academy. 
How should a prosecutor that is requesting the imprisonment of a person state his case if 
there was not a compulsory legislative decision regarding that issue? Again, we are not 
trained nor discuss in those terms. The scene is the one described by Garland, and the 
prevailing legislative option minimizes our possibilities and criticisms, moving the focus 
from the legal academic debate to areas of larger foreseeability and cohesion. How could a 
jurist like Alberdi state in Argentina the constitutional abandonment of whipping and, 




should be imposed and for how long? Criminal and constitutional law should recover their 
argumentative capacity over a space that was progressively given to penitentiary technique. 
 Thirdly, we should recover the interdisciplinary approach, given that imprisonment 
clearly exceeds the argumentative field and implies restrictions and interventions over the 
body and social and political life of a person. There was a time when legal medicine 
emerged as a prevailing science. In fact, it still defines the contours of criminal 
responsibility in key aspects such as the capacity to understand, mistakes in knowledge, 
states of violent emotions and the extent of the offence in those cases were the sexual or 
personal integrity of a person have been breached. Why has not this relationship been 
introduced in our understanding of imprisonment and its high rate of suicide, HIV and 
tuberculosis infections, beatings and many other proofs about the cruelty of state´s 
punishment? 
 I propose, in sum, to revise critically our usual way of presenting imprisonment in 
our discussions on criminal law. We must restore the discussion of punishment, in the way 
that we impose it today, in the central place it once had, if we truly think that that kind of 
punishment is a relevant problem for criminal law.  
